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Abstract 
 
 
This paper aims to identify whether the selected corporate governance practices of 
Malaysian Banks, affect either positively or negatively, its rate of return on equity 
(ROE). Descriptive research design has been used for this research to describe the 
characteristic of the banks’ compliance to corporate governance and the impact on its 
ROE. Data from all ten listed local banks in Malaysia were obtained to measure 
against four independent variables, ie. the proportion of non-executive directors, the 
proportion of institutional investors, the level of gearing and the concentration of 
ownership. It was found that the higher the level of gearing of the bank, the higher is 
the monitoring role of the lenders and the better would be the bank’s ROE. Future 
research can also compare pre and post-financial crisis corporate governance practices 
and its impact on Banks’ financial performances. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The East Asian country financial crisis of 1997-98, has brought many organizations to 
focus on corporate governance. Financial crisis demonstrates the importance of 
effective corporate governance in developing countries as founded by Krugman 
(1994)1, Radelet and Sachs (1998)2 and Rasiah (1999)3.  Indeed, weak corporate 
governance was one of the reasons which led East Asian businesses to poor 
investment decision, excessive diversification of a large business group and excessive 
exposure to debt. Many commentators, such as Noordin (1999)4, argued that the 
erosion of investor confidence in Malaysia was brought about by the country’s poor 
corporate governance standards and a lack of transparency in the financial system. 
 
Poor governance standards in both private and government-owned firms were 
blamed in part for the East Asian financial crisis. This resulted in considerable 
retrenchment and downsizing of operations, and the closure of many firms. In 
Malaysia, reforms in corporate governance were a focus of government responses to 
the crisis. The contraction of the Malaysia economy, along with instability in the 
commodity prices and a marked decline in share price, adversely affected the 
corporate sector. 
 
Attention was understandably been drawn to addressing and researching the 
underlying issues and factors that led to the crisis, with the view to learning how to 
prevent a recurrence of another crisis. However, it is still not clear whether poor 
corporate governance was a cause to the current global financial crisis and the 
economic meltdown.  
 
Nevertheless, restoration of confidence in the economy by the investors will rely 
on improvements in the corporate governance standard, including the adoption of 
transparency as an important strategy in corporate management. 
                                                
1
  Krugman, P. (1994), “The Myth of Asia Miracle”, Foreign Affairs 73, No. 6, pp. 62-78. 
2
  Radelet, S. and Sachs, J. (1998), “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects”,  
Research Paper, Brookings Panel, Washington D. C., 26-27 March, 1998. 
3
  Rasiah, R. (1999), “Assessing the Recovery Plans of Asian Economies Destabilized by Financial 
Crisis”, Conference Paper, Faculty of Economics and Business, UNIMAS. 
4
  Noordin, H. (1999), “Strengthening the Audit Mechanism”, Akauntan Nasional, April 1999, p. 24. 
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The majority of public listed companies in Malaysia has understood and accepted 
the concepts and codes of corporate governance since they were introduced in 2000. 
Government Linked Companies (GLCs) were among the first group of companies in 
Malaysia to comply with the corporate governance. The Government move by 
promoting good corporate governance in GLCs expected to set the example for the 
rest of the corporate sector due to their prominence and substantial component of the 
Malaysia economy.   
 
Many believe that good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic 
development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access 
to outside capital. However, the majority of public listed companies in Malaysia have 
understood and accepted the concepts and codes of corporate governance. 
 
If better corporate governance is related to better company’s performance, better-
governed companies should perform better than less-governed companies. 
 
For a weak corporation in these countries owe much to their very concentrated 
ownership structure, excessive government interventions, lack of transparency, 
disclosure and accountability, existence of a complex system of family-controlled 
companies and weak legal and regulatory framework for investor protection. 
 
In the Ninth Malaysia Plan, the government has intensified its effort to enhance 
the integrity, transparency and accountability of the public and private sectors and 
further improve the level of good governance in order to facilitate development. In 
order to make Malaysia a more competitive and developed nation, good principles of 
corporate governance must be properly implemented. The improvement of each 
economic sector performance in the country will partly enhance the importance of 
corporate governance in management. 
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2.0 PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
There have been numerous studies on corporate governance practices and firms’ 
financial performance but none was found specifically focusing on the banking 
industry in Malaysia. Hence, the purpose of this research is to fill this research gap 
and to study the following: 
 
1. To explore and contribute to current knowledge on some of the corporate 
governance practices that affect bank financial performance. 
2. To identify factors relating to corporate governance practices that affect the 
financial performance of banks. 
3. To discuss the results and highlight their implications on banks. 
 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many studies have been done to establish the link between strong corporate 
governance practices and financial performance. Indeed, there are studies that have 
found positive linkage between the two, as per a recent research conducted by Ponnu 
and Ramthandin (2008)5, conversely there is equally a growing number which have 
found no linkage between corporate governance practices and firms’ performance, as 
was found by Gompers et. al (2003)6.    
 
Whereas, the study by Stanwick P. A. and Stanwick S. D. (2002)7, implies that, 
using the rankings of the Best and Worst Board of Directors published in Business 
Week, the results showed that overall board performance does impact firm 
performance.   
                                                
5
  Ponnu C. H. and Ramthandin S. (2008), “Governance and Performance: Publicly Listed Companies 
in Malaysia”, Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp 35-53. 
6
  Gompers P. A. and Lerner L. (2003), “The really long-run performance of initial public offerings: 
The pre-Nasdaq evidence”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 4. 
7
  Stanwick, P. A. and Stanwick, S. D. (2002), “CEO and ethical reputation: visionary or mercenary?”, 
Management Decision”, 41/10, pp. 1050-57. 
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In a study conducted by Bhagat and Black (1999)8, it was found that there is no 
evidence to support that, firms should have a majority of independent directors 
because some majority-independent directors firms are less profitable than others.  
 
In earlier research of corporate governance, researchers have investigated few 
factors that may influence the performance of a firm. Among others are the 
governance role of independent directors, the governance role of institutional 
investors, the role of lenders and the concentration of ownership structure.  
 
3.1 The Governance Role of Independent Director 
 
You et al. (1986)9 reported a significant negative correlation between the proportion 
of ‘insider directors’ and bidder stock price return. This result suggested that 
companies with relatively more independent directors tend to be more profitable then 
those with fewer independent directors. They suggested that the independent directors 
lead more profits as they act to restrain the tendency of CEO to build his own 
financial empires. Denis and Sarin (1997)10 found that firms that substantially 
increased the proportion of independent directors have above-average stock price 
returns. Conversely, several studies suggested that firms with more independent 
directors perform worse, e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)11 found negative 
correlation between the proportions of outside directors with companies’ growth 
prospect of asset, while Bhagat and Black (1997)12 established from their study that 
high proportion of independent directors correlates with lower profitability.  
                                                
8
  Bhagat, S. and  Black, B. (1999), “The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and 
Firm Performance”, Columbia Law School, Working Paper No. 137. 
9
  You, Victor, R., Caves, M. Smith, and Henry, J. (1986), “Mergers and Bidders, Wealth; Managerial 
and Strategic Factors”, In The Economics of Strategic Planning: Essays in Honor of Joel Dean, 
edited by L. Glenn Thomas, III, Lexington, pp. 201-21. 
10
 Denis, D. J. and Sarin, A. (1997), “Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded 
Corporations”, Working Paper.  
11
 Agrawal, Anup and C. R. Knoeber (1996), “Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency 
Problems between Managers and Shareholders”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis”, 
31, No. 3, pp 377-97. 
12
 Bhagat S. and Black B. (1997), “Do Independent Directors Matter?”, Working Paper. 
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Allan 2004)13, in Malaysian’s context, found no significant impact between role of 
independent director with earnings of corporations. 
 
3.2 The Governance Role of Institutional Investors 
 
The large outside (institutional) shareholders are regarded as an effective monitoring 
mechanism. As was found by Pound (1988)14, investments made by institutional 
shareholders are so large that they have less ability than individual shareholders to 
move quickly in and out of funds without affecting the share price. As a result, 
institutional investors have a strong interest not only in the financial performance of 
the firms in which they invest, but also in strategies, activities, and other stakeholders 
of those firms as was reported in Fortune (1993)15.  
 
In addition to the monitoring role, Schleifer and Vishny (1986)16 argue that large 
outside shareholders assist the market for corporate control simply by being willing to 
sell their shares, should an appropriate bid be made. Institutional investors therefore 
have an incentive to monitor the behavior of managers, which would solve the free-
rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980)17. In a study of 201 firms 
facing control contests, Brickley et. al., (1997)18 found that the average institutional 
investor was more likely to vote and get involved in firm’s decisions than the average 
non-institutional shareholder, because of the former’s higher equity stake in the firm. 
Allan (2004)19, suggested that an increased proportion of institutional investors leads 
to increased return on equity.  
 
                                                
13
 Allan C. A. L. (2004), “The Impact of Corporate Governance Practices on Firms’ Financial 
Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Companies”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 21, 3, December 
2004, p. 308-18. 
14
 Pound, J. (1988), “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholders Oversight”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 20, pp. 237-65. 
15
 Fortune (1993), “What Activist Investors Want”, 8th March, 1993, pp. 59-63. 
16
 Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1986), “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 95, pp. 461-88. 
17
 Grossman, S. and Hart, O. D. (1980), “Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem and the Theory of the 
Corporation”, Bell Journal of Economics (Spring 1980), pp. 42-64. 
18
 Brickley, J., Coles, J. and Jarrell G. (1997), “Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and 
Chairman of the Board”, Journal of Corporate Finance”, 4, pp 189-220. 
19
 Allan C. A. L. (2004), “The Impact of Corporate Governance Practices on Firms’ Financial 
Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Companies”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 21, 3, December 
2004, p. 308-18.  
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3.3 The Role of Lenders in Corporate Governance 
 
It was suggested that the lender function as a force in corporate governance. Lenders 
are interested in repayment of credit, i.e. lenders are to ensure that the repayment of 
credit from a borrowing company is in accordance to the credit contract. Since the 
management’s actions of a company are one of the factors determining repayment, 
lenders may be motivated to carry out monitoring. 
 
Cable (1985)20 and Nibler (1995)21 discovered a positive relationship between 
apparent bank (lender) influence on companies and the profitability and growth of 
companies. However Chirinko and Elston (1996)22 did not find any significant 
relationship between bank influence and a company’s earnings.  
 
Allan (2004)23, who conducted a research on Malaysian companies, have 
concluded that more highly geared firms, or firms with relatively higher level of 
borrowings, have lower rate of returns on equity. He suggested that the higher debt 
limits the ability of the firm to take on risky and potentially profitable projects. This 
factor appears to carry more weight then the beneficial impact stemming from 
monitoring by lending banks. 
 
3.4 The Concentrated Ownership Structure 
 
Xu and Wang (1999)24, from a study on 127 Chinese companies listed in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shenzen Stock Exchange for the period 1993 to 1995, found 
a positive correlation between ownership concentration and firm performance. They 
suggest that large legal person shareholders have the incentive and power to effect the 
                                                
20
 Cable, J. (1985), “Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German 
Banks”, Economic Journal”, 95, pp. 118-32. 
21
 Nibler, Marcus (1995), “Bank Control and Corporate Performance in Germany: The Evidence”, 
Working Paper No. 48, St. John’s College, Cambridge, June 1995. 
22
 Chirinko, Robert S. and Elston, J. A. (1996), “Banking Relationships in Germany: Empirical Results 
and Policy Implications”, Working Paper, Emory University, May 1996. 
23
 Ibid no. 19. 
24
 Xu, Xiaonian and Wang, Y. (1999), “Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese 
Stock Companies”, China Economic Review, 10, Issue I. 
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company management. However Demsetz and Lehn (1985)25 found no significant 
correlation between ownership concentration and profit rates for 511 large 
corporations. This is similar to findings by Allan (2004)26 when he conducted study in 
Malaysian companies. Some empirical research on the impact of large owners on 
managerial compensation has provided evidence to support the notion that managerial 
opportunism persists in the absence of owners large enough to enforce their own 
interest. 
 
4.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study will indicate the different types of variables; the dependent variable and 
independent variable. The dependent variable used for the regression analysis is return 
on equity. There are four independent corporate governance variables hypothesized to 
influence firm’s performance. These are: number of non-executive directors (NED), 
proportion of large investors (INST), total amount of debt owed by the company 
(GEAR), and the proportion of concentrated ownership of the firm (CONCEN). These 
variables are adapted from past studies by Allan (2004)27 and Ponnu and Ramthandin 
(2008)28. 
 
The dependent variable is the financial performance of banks, where this will be 
measured through the return on equity (ROE). This variable is selected based on the 
research by Gugler, K. et.al (2003)29, where a strong corporate governance system is a 
system, which aligns managerial and shareholder interests and thus leads managers to 
maximize shareholder wealth. In this respect, the measure of returns of the banks is 
taken to be its ROE as it is one of the indicators of a company’s profitability and 
potential growth.  
                                                
25
 Demsetz, H and Lehn, K. (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences”, Journal of Political Economy”, 93 No. 6. pp. 1155-77. 
26
 Allan C. A. L. (2004), “The Impact of Corporate Governance Practices on Firms’ Financial 
Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Companies”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 21, 3, December 
2004, p. 308-18. 
27
 ibid. 
28
 Ponnu C. H. and Ramthandin S. (2008), “Governance and Performance: Publicly Listed Companies 
in Malaysia”, Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp 35-53. 
29
 Gugler, K., Mueller, C. D. and Yurtoglu, B.B. (2003), “Corporate Governance and the Returns on 
Investments”, European Corporate Governance Institute, France, Working Paper No. 06/2003, 
January 2003. 
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Reference is to be made to the conceptual framework of the study that is shown in 
Figure 1 below:  
 
 
Figure 1: Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
4.1 Statements of Hypotheses 
 
Based on the above theoretical framework, this study intends to examine the link 
between each corporate governance practice and banks’ return on equity. Thus, the 
following hypotheses have been developed to be tested: 
 
H1 : There is a positive relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors 
over the total number of directors on the board of the bank, and the ROE. 
H2 : There is a positive relationship between the proportion of large institutional 
investors, and the ROE. 
H3 : There is a positive relationship between the level of gearing and the ROE. 
H4 : There is a positive relationship between the proportion of concentrated ownership 
of the bank, and the ROE. 
 
 
 
1. NED : Number of non-executive 
directors, divided by the total number 
of directors on the board of company 
2. INST : Proportion of large institutional 
investors owning shares in the 
company 
3. GEAR : Total amount of debt owed by 
the company divided by its total capital 
(shareholders’ ordinary funds + long 
term debt) 
4. CONCEN : Proportion of concentrated 
ownership of the firm (single person, 
an entity or few entities) 
 
• Return on Equity (ROE) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
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5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Research Design 
 
In this research, all the local banks listed in the Bursa Malaysia were taken as the 
sample, since there are only ten listed local banks in Malaysia. 
  
Descriptive research design has been used for this research to describe the 
characteristic of the bank’s compliance to corporate governance and the impact on its 
ROE in order to help clearly understand the level of its practice by Malaysian banks 
in general. 
 
The descriptive design method is chosen since it would be the most systematic 
and straightforward method in understanding the trend of corporate governance 
practices and compliance among banks. This is done through correlation and 
regression analysis. 
 
5.2 Data Gathering and Sampling Method 
 
The five variables in this research were obtained through secondary data extracted 
from the latest Annual Reports (i.e. either 2007 or 2008) of all the listed local banks in 
Malaysia, downloaded from the respective banks’ official website. 
 
The ROE is calculated using the following formula: 
 
 
 
5.3 Definition of Variables 
 
The SPSS (version 14.0) statistical software was used to analyze the data through the 
use of statistical method i.e. bivariate correlation and linear regression. The result of 
ROE =     _    Net Income____              
                          Shareholder’s Fund 
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regression is an equation that represents the best prediction of a dependent variable 
from several independent variables.  
 
The items in the scorecard will be rated using the following measurement:- 
 
Table 1: Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Measurement Characteristic 
NED Number of non-executive directors, divided by the total number of 
directors on the board of bank. 
INST  Proportion of the largest institutional investors owning shares in the 
bank. 
GEAR Total amount of debt owed by the bank divided by its total capital. 
(shareholders’ ordinary funds + long term debt) 
CONCEN Proportion of the highest concentrated ownership of the bank (single 
person, an entity or few entities) 
ROE Net Income / Shareholder's Equity 
 
All the variables are in the ratio form. 
 
6.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The findings of this study, which attempts to establish the significant factors 
pertaining to corporate governance that affects Banks’ financial performance are as 
follows. 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
10 4.58 18.73 11.7950 5.03669 
10 .42 .90 .7500 .17857 
10 7.32 100.00 68.5630 36.57009 
10 8.89 19.85 14.9650 3.58340 
10 19.17 100.00 70.2420 33.72028 
10 
ROE 
NED 
INST 
GEAR 
CONCEN 
Valid N (listwise) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Table 2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
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From Table 2 above, it is observed that the data is very widely spread for INST and 
CONCEN, indicating that the Malaysian banking entities’ ownership structure varies 
a great deal. For example, the proportion of institutional ownership of banks range 
from as low as 7.32% to 68.56%, while the single highest shareholder also ranges 
from a low of 19.17% to 70.24%.      
 
6.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
  Table 3: Summary Results of Pearson Correlation 
ROE NED INST GEAR CONCEN 
Pearson Correlation -.301 -.228 .735 -.171 
Sig (2-tailed) .398 .527 .015 .637 
 
Based on the results in Table 3 above, it can be seen that the GEAR variable is 
highly correlated to the ROE with a positive .735 with a significant level of .015 (ie.  
p < 0.05). 
 
This implies that higher gearing contributes to higher ROE, which is in line with 
corporate finance theory on leverage, where additional funding/borrowing (probably 
obtained from cheaper source of funds) can contribute to potential higher income 
from lending activities, leading to a higher ROE.  
 
Conversely, NED, INST and CONCEN are negatively correlated to ROE, 
indicating that higher proportion of NED, INST or CONCEN do not result in higher 
ROE. The results in the analysis was also not significant. This appear somewhat to be 
contrary to the common understanding that higher INST or CONCEN would 
generally lead to more close monitoring by the shareholders, which will lead to higher 
ROE. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
12 
6.3 Regression Analysis 
    
   Table 4: Summary of the Regressions Model 
 
  
  
  
(a)
 Predictors (Constant): NED, INST, GEAR, CONCEN   
 
The results as measured by R2 which indicates a strong impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable, by which, the independent variables explain 
75.4% of the variance in the ROE, as shown in the Table 4 above. 
 
Based on the adjusted R2 of 55.6%, it can be confirmed that more than half of 
relationship with ROE can be explained by the four independent variables used in this 
research. The remaining 44.4% of the impact to ROE is explained by other factors. 
 
 Table 5: Result of Regression Analysis using Enter Method 
 
From Table 5 above, the only variable that was found to be statistically significant 
in influencing the ROE was the GEAR. This is concluded through an examination of 
the t-values and beta i.e. t = 3.209 and sig (p = 0.024, p < 0.05), by which, the 
predictor is making significant contribution to the model. The smaller the p value of 
significance and the larger the value of t, the greater the contribution of the predictor.  
 
 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .868(a) .754 .556 3.35478 
Coefficients   a 
2.932 7.904 .371 .726 
-19.028 13.812 -.675 -1.378 .227 
-.170 .286 -1.236 -.595 .578 
1.090 .340 .775 3.209 .024 
.263 .281 1.763 .938 .391 
(Constant) 
NED 
INST 
GEAR 
CONCEN 
Model 
1 
B Std. Error 
Unstandardized
Coefficients 
Beta 
Standardized
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
a Dependent Variable: ROE 
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 Table 6: Result of Regression Analysis using Step-wise Method 
 
 
The ‘Step-wise Method’ as per Table 6 above, also confirms the significant result 
of GEAR, while excluding the three other non-significant independent variables of 
NED, INST and CONCEN. 
 
From the results, it could also be interpreted that in order to increase the ROE, 
there need to be a reduction of NED. This may be true based on the argument that the 
lesser the number of non-executive directors in the bank (ie. the higher the number of 
executive directors), the decision making will be better since more of the directors 
will be directly involved in the running of the bank. 
 
The INST had also impacted this research, such that, the lower the INST, the 
better would be the ROE. This may be explained by the fact that one exceptional bank 
shareholding in Malaysia, which is, Public Bank Bhd, is still very much a family 
controlled entity and its financial performance is very commendable. It could also be 
seen that higher INST may deprive the banks to make swift decisions in terms of 
strategic direction, which may ultimately lead to lower ROE. 
 
Excluded Variables b 
-.267 a -1.132 .295 -.393 .998 
-.083 a -.319 .759 -.120 .959 
-.038 a -.146 .888 -.055 .967 
NED 
INST 
CONCEN 
Model 
1 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation Tolerance 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), GEAR a. 
Dependent Variable: ROE b. 
Coefficients a 
-3.666 5.171 -.709 .498 
1.033 .337 .735 3.066 .015 
(Constant) 
GEAR 
Model 
1 
B Std. Error 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Dependent Variable: ROE a. 
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The inverse relationship found in NED and INST is also found in CONCEN, 
where, higher concentration of shareholding by a single person, leads to lower ROE, 
similar to the impact of INST above. A lower concentration by any single person 
leads to a diverse range of shareholders, who might be more interested in the banks’ 
performance individually, than a few large shareholders.         
 
Based on the regression analysis, the equation of ROE as the dependent variable 
can be derived as below: 
 
 
ROE = 2.932 -19.028NED - 0.170INST + 1.090GEAR + 0.263CONCEN 
 
 
The above equation can be interpreted as such that, a 1.09% change in GEAR will 
result in a 1.00% change in ROE. 
 
Based on the analysis and results it can be concluded that the higher the gearing 
ratio, the higher the monitoring would be by the lenders, which then leads to higher 
performance of the bank. In actual sense, a higher gearing ratio leads to higher level 
of debt burden, which forces management of the banks to choose potentially higher 
return on investment or high yielding assets to earn high ROE.  
 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
 
From the research conducted and the strength of the models, almost all the 
independent variables were found to be statistically insignificant in influencing the 
ROE, except for GEAR, which had some level of significant influence on the ROE.  
 
As such, we can only accept H3 and conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of gearing of a bank and its ROE. In other words, the higher the 
level of gearing of the bank, the higher is the monitoring role of the lenders and the 
better would be the bank’s financial performance, in terms of its ROE. In the context 
of this research where the entities being researched are banks, lenders, in a broad 
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sense would mean depositors or investors and it is the productive use of this funds 
combined with sound corporate governance practices which would lead to a better 
ROE.  
 
Nevertheless, while having good corporate governance practice is a requirement 
in Malaysian’s Companies Act; as laid out in Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance, it is difficult to conclusively say that it is corporate governance that 
drives a bank’s profitability because of the weak link of the remaining three 
independent variables in this research. However, the 55% result of the R2 does suggest 
that to a larger extent, corporate governance practices do impact the ROE of banks. 
 
Due to restriction in time for more data gathering, it is hoped that further research 
would be carried out in this area. It would be particularly interesting to find out 
whether the results would be the same, post-financial crisis or with a broader range of 
independent variables relating to Corporate Governance. Finally, it is hoped that this 
research has contributed in terms of understanding of the effect of corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia especially in the banking sector. 
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Key Statistics*  
 
Bank ROE NED INST GEAR CONCEN 
  
No of Non-
exec 
D'tor/tot no 
of directors 
Prop of 
large inst. 
Investor 
Total debt/ 
total capital 
(S/h fund + 
LT Debt 
Prop of 
concentrated 
ownership 
AmBank 9.32 0.42 19.17 11.72 19.17 
Affin Bank 5.94 0.88 100.00 8.89 100.00 
Alliance 14.67 0.90 100.00 16.59 100.00 
Bank Islam 4.58 0.82 51.00 16.58 51.00 
CIMB 17.75 0.80 99.99 19.85 99.99 
EON Bank 7.10 0.83 100.00 10.11 100.00 
Hong Leong 14.58 0.73 63.48 16.95 63.48 
Maybank 15.17 0.80 44.67 17.32 44.67 
Public Bank 18.73 0.43 7.32 17.32 24.11 
RHB Bank 10.11 0.89 100.00 14.32 100.00 
* Raw data obtained from the respective banks’ 2007/2008 Annual Reports posted on its official 
website.   
 
Descriptives 
Descriptive Statistics
10 4.58 18.73 11.7950 5.03669
10 .42 .90 .7500 .17857
10 7.32 100.00 68.5630 36.57009
10 8.89 19.85 14.9650 3.58340
10 19.17 100.00 70.2420 33.72028
10
ROE
NED
INST
GEAR
CONCEN
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
 
Correlations 
Correlations
1 -.301
.398
10 10
-.301 1
.398
10 10
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ROE
NED
ROE NED
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Correlations 
 
Correlations
1 -.228
.527
10 10
-.228 1
.527
10 10
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ROE
INST
ROE INST
 
 
Correlations 
Correlations
1 .735*
.015
10 10
.735* 1
.015
10 10
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ROE
GEAR
ROE GEAR
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
 
Correlations 
Correlations
1 -.171
.637
10 10
-.171 1
.637
10 10
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ROE
CONCEN
ROE CONCEN
 
 
Regression 
Variables Entered/Removedb
CONCEN,
GEAR,
NED, INST
a . Enter
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
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Model Summaryb
.868a .754 .556 3.35478 .754 3.822 4 5 .087
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
R Square
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), CONCEN, GEAR, NED, INSTa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
 
 
ANOVAb
172.041 4 43.010 3.822 .087a
56.273 5 11.255
228.314 9
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CONCEN, GEAR, NED, INSTa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
5.1842 18.7300 11.7950 4.37215 10
-5.56616 4.42596 .00000 2.50050 10
-1.512 1.586 .000 1.000 10
-1.659 1.319 .000 .745 10
Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Predicted Value
Std. Residual
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Dependent Variable: ROEa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
Coefficients a 
2.932 7.904 .371 .726 
-19.028 13.812 -.675 -1.378 .227 
-.170 .286 -1.236 -.595 .578 
1.090 .340 .775 3.209 .024 
.263 .281 1.763 .938 .391 
(Constant) 
NED 
INST 
GEAR 
CONCEN 
Model 
1 
B Std. Error 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Dependent Variable: ROE a. 
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Variables Entered/Removeda
GEAR .
Stepwise
(Criteria:
Probabilit
y-of-
F-to-enter
<= .050,
Probabilit
y-of-
F-to-remo
ve >= .
100).
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
Dependent Variable: ROEa. 
 
 
Model Summary
.735a .540 .483 3.62206
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), GEARa. 
 
 
ANOVAb
123.359 1 123.359 9.403 .015a
104.954 8 13.119
228.314 9
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), GEARa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-3.666 5.171 -.709 .498
1.033 .337 .735 3.066 .015
(Constant)
GEAR
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: ROEa. 
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Excluded Variablesb
-.267a -1.132 .295 -.393 .998
-.083a -.319 .759 -.120 .959
-.038a -.146 .888 -.055 .967
NED
INST
CONCEN
Model
1
Beta In t Sig.
Partial
Correlation Tolerance
Collinearity
Statistics
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), GEARa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
 
 
Charts
1.00.80.60.40.20.0
Observed Cum Prob
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 
Cu
m
 
Pr
ob
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: ROE
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1.51.00.50.0-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0
Regression Standardized Residual
2
0
-2
Re
gr
es
sio
n 
St
an
da
rd
ize
d 
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 
Va
lu
e
Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: ROE
 
0.150.100.050.00-0.05-0.10-0.15
NED
2.50
0.00
-2.50
-5.00
-7.50
RO
E
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: ROE
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6.003.000.00-3.00-6.00-9.00
INST
5.00
2.50
0.00
-2.50
-5.00
R
O
E
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: ROE
 
7.505.002.500.00-2.50-5.00
GEAR
7.50
5.00
2.50
0.00
-2.50
-5.00
R
O
E
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: ROE
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9.006.003.000.00-3.00-6.00
CONCEN
2.50
0.00
-2.50
-5.00
R
O
E
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: ROE
 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
 
Variables Entered/Removed a
GEAR .
Stepwise
(Criteria:
Probabilit
y-of-
F-to-enter
<= .050,
Probabilit
y-of-
F-to-remo
ve >= .
100).
Model
1
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
Dependent Variable: ROEa. 
 
 
Model Summaryb
.735a .540 .483 3.62206 .540 9.403 1 8 .015
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
R Square
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
Change Statistics
Predictors: (Constant), GEARa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
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ANOVAb
123.359 1 123.359 9.403 .015a
104.954 8 13.119
228.314 9
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), GEARa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
 
 
Coefficientsa
-3.666 5.171 -.709 .498
1.033 .337 .735 3.066 .015
(Constant)
GEAR
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: ROEa. 
 
 
Excluded Variablesb
-.267a -1.132 .295 -.393 .998
-.083a -.319 .759 -.120 .959
-.038a -.146 .888 -.055 .967
NED
INST
CONCEN
Model
1
Beta In t Sig.
Partial
Correlation Tolerance
Collinearity
Statistics
Predictors in the Model: (Constant), GEARa. 
Dependent Variable: ROEb. 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
5.5185 16.8420 11.7950 3.70224 10
-8.88356 4.50190 .00000 3.41491 10
-1.695 1.363 .000 1.000 10
-2.453 1.243 .000 .943 10
Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Predicted Value
Std. Residual
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Dependent Variable: ROEa. 
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